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AGENDA FOR AD HOC COMMITTEE

MEETING ON GRAY REPORT

4 MARCH 1952

STAT

1. Status report on  work on draft of Presidential statement.
2. Committee views on Wisner analysis of Gray report.
3. Committee recommendation against publication of Gray report in present form.
4. Committee views on scope of revision: (a) deletions; (b) correction of patent errors; (c) changes of phraseology; and (d) major substitutions and substantial additions of strengthening material.
5. Consideration of report revised to accomplish certain deletions, with explanatory marginal notes, to determine sufficiency as to publication as important parts of Gray report.
6. Committee memorandum to Board through DCI.
  - a. Committee conclusions as to analysis.
  - b. Committee recommendations as to deletions and other revisions.
  - c. Committee recommendations as to desirability of publishing undeleted portions and other revisions.
  - d. Committee recommendations as to desirability of concurrent Presidential statement and its form.
  - e. Preparation of finished copy of parts of report recommended to be published.
  - f. Committee preparation of draft of Presidential statement.

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

We face today one of the great convulsions of history. The world in which we live is being changed by strong currents of thought and feeling -- currents released by the American and French Revolutions in the 18th Century, by the Industrial Revolution in the 19th and by two destructive wars and the Russian Revolution in our own time. This is no longer the world into which most of us were born. We may be sure that it will be a far different world before we die.

In this time of crisis and stress, the American nation has risen to a new role. We may speak of this role without vanity or self-consciousness because we did not seek it but rather tried to avoid it. Our role, as we have now expressed it in our national policies, is to help lead the nations through this time of turmoil in such a way that in the end there shall be an expansion -- not a reduction -- of the areas of freedom and knowledge. Expressed in another way, our role is to build a bridge over the abyss of confusion and frustration so that humanity may safely cross. If we can succeed in this role, the peoples of the world may be spared the sacrifice of human life and achievement which accompanied other great convulsions of history, and each nation may find release for its energies and genius in an era of peace and human dignity.

(W #7)  
(M)

It will not be easy for us to play this role. For apart from the natural flow of historical forces, we know that the leaders of another great power have determined to exploit the trials of this period to the full. Years ago the men in the Kremlin sensed the approach of this turning point in human affairs. Today they are working, scheming, to intensify the strains, compound the chaos and ride the currents of nationalism, social unrest and despair to their ultimate goal of a world serving the ends of the Kremlin. Their strategy might be condensed into three words: Ruin and rule.

(W #7)  
(M)

Our reaction to this drive for world power was slow, but when it came, it took the form of an idea. This idea -- at first expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan -- was basically as simple as this: America will help those who, believing in freedom, help themselves and help each other. Behind the force of this idea we put our economic and industrial strength. To the countries which showed a will to survive and to cooperate, we sent food, machines to grow more food, and still more machines to produce everything from shoes to electricity. We sent them our technical experts to raise production in their factories and on their farms,

to drain swamps, to dam rivers, to drive out malaria and other diseases, to teach the three r's. When the allies and dupes of the Kremlin spread lies about this effort, we launched a campaign of truth over the air waves, in newspapers, in films, in public meetings. Then we helped our friends in the free world to raise a defensive shield over this peaceful effort.

Our economic help, our information program, our defense effort -- if wisely used -- are indispensable parts of the American program for bridging this period of upheaval. But the relentless assault of the Kremlin upon the bridge has demonstrated the need of another element. This missing element is an integrated psychological strategy.

There are practical and compelling reasons why we should make the fullest use of our resources in ideas and imagination, why we should make certain that all our sacrifices are directed toward the attainment of clearly defined ends. We must think in terms of preserving our country's economic, as well as moral, fiber in order to continue successfully our role of leadership.

Our aim is peace -- not war. Though a protective shield is necessary to peace in a world threatened with war, we cannot indefinitely pour out our resources for economic and military aid, and preserve our own strength. We must use our ingenuity to find less costly means to produce situations of strength which will reduce the possibilities of war and simultaneously serve to shorten the present conflict.

In doing so, we must make it clear to those who are our friends, and to those who would be our friends, that we not only abhor militaristic imperialism, but also that we disclaim cultural and intellectual imperialism as well. The only rule we seek is the Golden Rule.

## THE BACKGROUND

Toward the end of the first World War, a Russian revolutionary leader conceived the idea of a kind of struggle which would be "neither war nor peace." That leader was later disposed of by his less inventive comrades, but they eventually found merit in his idea and resolved to adapt it to the convulsive situation which would follow the second World War. Today the world knows the meaning of their choice -- an assault which stops short of general war, carried out under the cloak of an unnatural peace.

That assault began, in fact, before the second World War was over. As the armies of the Western Allies advanced, the forces of international Communism set to work in their rear to poison the minds of the liberated against the liberators, to turn the free nations against each other, to seize positions of power, and to break down the prestige of the United States. And while the victorious nations of the West were disbanding their armed forces, the Kremlin's men in every country were moving to battle stations in preparation for the "final struggle" so long foretold in Communist song and fable.

In blaming ourselves for what came after, we often overlook the fact that the leaders of Bolshevism had been training themselves in this kind of combat for a good half-century. Within their own country, they had graduated from the hard school of conspiracy and revolution. After their seizure of power in Russia, their institutes of political warfare had schooled foreign fanatics in the techniques of infiltration, subversion and the conquest of power. Throughout the world they had built up networks of agents who would move at the word of command to \* \* \* forment (sic) a civil war.

(barry  
out an  
assassi-  
nation  
or)W #13  
and  
Phillips  
Contra M

There was no great element of genius in the Kremlin's effort, but that effort had mass and momentum and a fanatical persistence. And although Communism had lost much of its power to convert, the Soviets still retained ample power to confuse. The classic rule of imperialism, "Divide and conquer" guided much of what they did. Nation against nation, race against race, man against man -- this was their stock in trade. They knew, of course, how to take advantage of men's vices, but they found it just as profitable to appeal to men's virtues. They twisted honest labor \* \* \* (and) lured unwary churchmen into furthering their strategy of confusion. They even found a way to use the word "peace" as a weapon of assault.

(Shook  
down  
timid  
employers)  
W #13  
Contra  
M and P

The advantage in warfare accrues to the aggressor. In the disillusionment, the weariness, the confusion of the post-war world,

the forces of Communism advanced confidently toward the ultimate goal set by the Soviet leaders -- a world responsive to the Kremlin.

Inevitably the leadership of the assaulted peoples imposed itself upon the United States, for we were the one great power which had come out of the war with reserves of moral and material strength. But by temperament and by tradition we Americans were ill-fitted for this kind of struggle. We fight wars the way we play football. We want to win, tear up the goal posts and then go home. We found it hard in 1945 -- we find it hard today -- to comprehend that peace may be made an extension of war by other means. We called back our fighting men and returned them to their homes \* \* \*. We all but dismantled our wartime information services, thus opening the world to the Soviet lie. As a nation we tried to reverse time and re-discover the peaceful existence of the years before the war.

((thus exposing Europe and Asia to Soviet black-mail))

W #13

Cont'd M & P

Thus nearly two years passed before we began to face up to the responsibility of leadership which had come upon us.

When we did react, we moved one step at a time. First we pledged our support to Greece and Turkey, two nations which were holding the gates of the Near East in the face of increasing pressure from Communism. Then, when the Kremlin strategists shifted the weight of the Communist assault to Western Europe, we launched the Marshall Plan and brought together 16 nations to work for European recovery. With the aid of these nations we set Western Germany on the road to rehabilitation, and when the Soviets set siege to the free city of Berlin, we and our British allies improvised the airlift and saved that outpost of freedom. Next we moved to the aid of Yugoslavia, whose government had defied the Kremlin, and we were successful to this extent in rolling back the iron curtain. In the following years, together with our European allies, we began to raise a protective shield over the work of recovery.

Though we had started out without a long-range plan or blue print, the net result of all these efforts was a solid piece of construction. \* \* \* We and our allies had set great ideas in motion -- the ideas of the Atlantic Community, of European Union, of a coal-steel pool for Western Europe, and of a European army.

((A wall against Communist aggression was erected from the Black

Sea to the North Cape of Norway. Even more important for the long run,)) W #11 + M

Balked in Europe and the Near East, the Communist strategists turned the main force of their assault to Asia. Even there, where human misery was great and the old order in decay, the power of Communism as an idea had to be backed by the force of arms and a spurious appeal to nationalism. The Chinese Communist armies advanced

across China until they had conquered the mainland and stood at the gates of Southeast Asia. At the same time, Communist forces, ranging from guerrilla bands to mass armies, brought terror to Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines.

Then the North Korean Communists launched an open attack upon the Republic of Korea, a ward of the United Nations. This was a challenge to the United States in the first instance and to the free world as a whole. If it had not been squarely faced, it would have opened the floodgates of disaster in Asia. But the United States faced it, and, backed by the United Nations, repulsed the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists who had joined them. This military success may well have been a turning point. It was supplemented by a great diplomatic achievement in the face of determined Soviet opposition -- the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan which restored that key nation of Asia to the community of nations.

W #7 9/17

So in the five years which followed the second World War we could look back upon some successes and some failures. We could also look forward to further -- and possibly greater -- trials. Our economic and defense programs, pursued in cooperation with our friends, were restoring economic health and raising confidence that peace could be maintained. Yet, at the same time, they were causing misgivings in many parts of the world because they seemed to some people to be manifestations of a new imperialism. \*\*\* .

W #7 9/17

(In fact, the "reservoir of goodwill" for the United States which had existed in many countries was being seriously depleted.)

W #9 and  
Phillips

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Early in 1951 a feeling developed within the U. S. government that we had to do more than we had done in the past to win and hold the confidence of our friends abroad and weaken the will of our enemies.

(Wisner #8  
& Sargent  
& Magruder)  
(See Phillips)

This feeling was the result of an evolutionary process. In the departments and agencies of the government a great deal of reflection had been given to the lessons we had learned in the struggle and a general desire had developed to concert our efforts to better effect.

(Wisner #8  
& Magruder)

\*\*\*\*\*

(3rd Paragraph  
deleted -  
Sargent)

Furthermore, there was a diffusion of national power among departments, conscious of traditional compartmentation of interests and authority and on guard against intrusion in affairs felt to be their exclusive concern. The interdepartmental difficulties and lack of unified leadership denied to the United States the full value and impact of her bold acts in recent years.

(Wisner #7)  
(See Magruder)

But what was the answer to the problem? Was it possible to develop a strategic concept which would put more order and drive into all phases of our effort? And could we present our policies in the hearts and souls of men and make them feel that their cause was our cause?

(Wisner #7)  
(See Magruder)

\*\*\*\*\*

(6th paragraph  
deleted -  
Sargent &  
Wisner #3 &  
Magruder)

\* \* \* \* \*

(1st paragraph  
deleted -  
Sargent &  
Wisner #3 &  
Magruder)

\* \* \* \* \*

(2nd paragraph  
deleted -  
Sargent &  
Wisner #3.  
See also re-  
commended  
insertion  
Wisner #4 &  
Magruder)

\* \* \* the President directed that the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should serve as a Psychological Strategy Board. Under them there would be a Director appointed by the President. The Director would have a permanent staff to help him carry out his responsibilities. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would sit with the Board as its principal military adviser.

("To accom-  
plish this  
purpose"  
eliminated  
to obtain  
consonance  
with un-  
deleted text)

The President's order made the Board responsible for the "formulation and promulgation . . . of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort." It was to report to the National Security Council on its own activities and on the activities of all agencies engaged in the effort to influence men's minds \* \* \*

("and wills"  
Wisner #12  
& Phillips)  
(See Magruder)

This was a broad mandate. In setting "over-all national psychological objectives," the Board would identify \* \* \* what we were trying to accomplish. Then it would draw up policies and programs to achieve those objectives. It would bring together all the government agencies which could play a part in such programs and find out what they could contribute. It would follow through and make sure that all the agencies were working together and doing their part. It would constantly study the progress of these programs to influence other people in favor of our work for peace and freedom. It would report to the National Security Council on these programs and the over-all effort in the field of psychological strategy.

("exactly"  
Wisner #16 &  
Magruder)



The Board would have an acute realization that every significant action in the field of foreign affairs by any governmental agency has an effect upon the minds \* \* \* of men. To maximize that effect the government must act in its different spheres according to a common plan which relates all actions together.

("and wills"  
Wisner #12  
and Phillips)  
(See Magruder)

The President's directive did not put the Board into the field of operations. The Board would not, for example, manage the Voice of America or any of the information offices which the government had set up in other countries. It was to be a high-level group working in the field of broad strategy and coordination.

The first Director went to work on July 2, 1951. The Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency lent him enough help to set up the nucleus of a staff. This staff was organized in this way:

1. An Office of Plans and Policy. This staff group works on broad strategic problems, defines the objectives which we should aim at in our psychological effort, and draws up, in cooperation with other agencies, the programs to achieve those objectives.
2. An Office of Coordination. This staff group helps tie together the efforts already under way in the psychological field and follows through on plans and programs approved by the Board.
3. An Office of Evaluation and Review. This staff group obtains from other agencies of the government the intelligence estimates which the staff needs for its work and prepares evaluations of the effectiveness of American psychological operations.
4. An Executive Office for administrative matters.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Last paragraph  
deleted -  
Sargent &  
Wisner #10)  
(See Magruder)

\*\*\*\*\* "Some Misconceptions" section omitted (pp 10-11) - Sargeant and W #1. and M.

THE PSB CONCEPT (See W #2 on this section generally and undesirable reference to conflicting views in the omitted "Misconceptions.") See also M.

In the course of their work the Director and his staff ("on these matters." Sargeant) reached a number of conclusions \* \* \*.

In the first place, they quickly made up their minds that the Board's mandate covered a great deal more than word warfare. The task of the Board, they believed, was not to explain -- or explain away -- events but to help shape events. For this reason, they felt that the Board, though not primarily a policy-making body, should strive to obtain wise policies and develop sound programs which would establish an identity between our aims and those of other free nations.

On the other hand, the Director and staff did not accept the view that the Board should concern itself with "almost everything." \* \* \* As they saw it, if the Board became entangled in day-to-day decisions and tried to intervene in all fields of government activity, it would soon cease to be a strategy board and would become a "Board of Improvised Tactics." ("They felt, particularly, that their instructions to stay out of operational matters were sound." W #14. and M.)

In the third place the Director and his staff became convinced that it not only is possible but imperative to plan our efforts to influence men's minds and wills. When a nation projects its budgetary outlays at the rate of \$200,000,000 or more a day, it can not afford to make up its policies and programs as it goes along. And when it is facing a ruthless opponent who has given half a century of thought to this kind of conflict, it must buckle down to the grim business of trying to think ahead of him. In the opinion of the Director and his staff, the U.S. has the capacity to make plans which will retain the psychological initiative for the free world and pin down our opponents on the defensive. (Sargeant W #7. See M.)

Fourthly the Director and his staff did not share the view that intelligence deficiencies rule out effective psychological activity. With ingenuity and imagination, they believed, much effective work can be undertaken on the basis of our present knowledge. Later, as our information improves, adjustments can be made in aims and methods.

In the fifth place, the Director and staff rejected the view that effective actions to rally our friends and confound our enemies must await the military build-up. They recalled that the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift and other successful programs had been carried out when we had barely one effective fighting division in Europe. As they saw it, the task for psychological strategy was to help create situations of strength, not to wait for their creation.

Sixth, the Director and the staff recognized that military strategy is a matter for the military, and they welcomed military participation in the assessment of possible repercussions from our activities designed to influence the minds and wills of other peoples. But, they pointed out, we are in a struggle in which we hope that the application of military power will not be the decisive factor. Strategic planning must go forward on the broadest lines and include all elements of \* \* \* persuasion if we are to succeed in our national effort to preserve peace and extend freedom.

("pressure and"-  
W #12 and Phillips)  
See M.

Finally, all the discussion within the staff pointed toward the conclusion that this is not a cold war but a war of wills. The term, cold war, which had been useful in arousing the American people five years ago, is harmful today because it conveys the impression of a remote, impersonal conflict which we are powerless to influence. The Director and his staff believed it is within our power to influence the course of this conflict. They believed that leadership could produce the will in the government, the Congress and the people to turn events in our favor and gradually strengthen the forces working for peace. Perhaps the greatest test and the major contribution, of the Psychological Strategy Board will be the development of such a collective will within the government.

See Sargeant's  
point.

These were some of the convictions which grew out of the work of the Director and his staff.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD TODAY (See Wisner #5 for proposed additional material)

By the end of 1951, a large part of the staff had been gathered. The Director had at his disposal an able and dedicated group of men and women from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Mutual Security Administration and from private enterprise. It was contemplated that the staff would remain small by governmental standards. Altogether it would number about seventy-five persons, including professional, clerical and administrative personnel.

The efforts of this staff were supplemented by panels of experts drawn from all the agencies of government and by consultants from the outside. These efforts covered a wide field.

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(The remainder of paragraph omitted) Sargeant and W #15 See M.

As the work progressed the members of the Board developed a corporate spirit and a sense of purpose. Formal meetings to approve new projects and hear reports on projects already under way were held about every three weeks. Informal luncheon meetings were held every week for exchanges of views on the Board's problems. At the meetings each member of the Board came up with ideas for new activities and each member made his contribution to the reports which set new projects in motion.

Much spade-work, of course, remains to be done. The first Director had to leave to his successor many problems of staff procedure and organization, as well as problems of policy and strategy. But it can be said that the Psychological Strategy Board is definitely a going concern. In a little more than half a year's time, the concept of combined operations, with all agencies of government concerting their efforts toward a common end, has gained ground. Much work which might not have been undertaken if there had been no Board has been started and some concrete results have been achieved. It still is too early to say whether the Board is the answer to the problem which it was designed to meet, but it has made a worthwhile start.

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(Deletion as to Gray recommendations) Sargeant, M, and Wisner #6. See Wisner proposed substitution.

On the basis of the experience to date it does not appear desirable to give the Board a statutory base or to make other drastic modifications in its charter.

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(Deleted Gray recommendation paragraph) Sargeant and Wisner

The members of the Board must be determined to exercise their mandate vigorously and effectively and to make full use of the available resources. Just as important, the staffs of their departments and of other agencies of government must be ready to participate in the Board work with a sense of the role of leadership which America is called upon to play. \* \* \* \* \*

("This is no time to let rivalries between agencies or the passion for the lowest common denominator in ideas determine the scope of our national effort".) Sargeant

\* \* \* \* \*

("If failures of this kind should prevent the Board from effectively discharging its mandate, it will be necessary to reconsider the possibility of setting up a more centralized direction of the national effort in the war of wills.") Sargeant and Wisner #17